Abstract This paper analyzes uniform pricing, coverage constraints and price caps in markets newly opened to competition, e.g. broadband services. We show that the requirement of uniform pricing has strong repercussions on coverage decisions. Imposed on incumbents only it may distort their coverage decision downward to avoid duopoly entry. If also imposed on entrants it increases the likelihood that entry leads to independent monopolies rather than competition. A sufficiently large coverage constraint on incumbents reestablishes incentives for duopoly entry, but may lead to higher prices.
Introduction
We analyze the effect of uniform pricing (UP, or non-discrimination) constraints on outcomes in regulated markets with new entry. It has been observed in the literature that a UP constraint makes incumbent firms less aggressive (Armstrong & Vickers, 1993; Anton, Vander Weide, & Vettas, 2002; Choné, Flochel, & Perrot, 2000; Valletti, Hoernig, & Barros, 2002) , which has the direct effect of making entry more attractive. Nevertheless, if incumbents are still free to choose their coverage, it is possible that the entrant's coverage and total coverage are smaller with the UP constraint than without it (Valletti et al., 2002) . Therefore, the competitive effects of UP constraints are ambiguous.
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School of Economics, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Campus de Campolide, 1099-032 Lisboa, Portugal, and CEPR, 90-98, Goswell Road, London EC1V 7RR, UK e-mail: shoernig@fe.unl.pt In this paper, we go a step further by studying the imposition of a UP constraint on the entrant as well as on the incumbent. We also consider the interplay of these constraints with coverage constraints and price caps. Uniform pricing constraints often appear together with coverage constraints involving the whole population, and both form the basis of universal service obligations (see e.g. Crandall & Waverman, 2000; Laffont & Tirole, 2000) . Still, there are markets where coverage constraints either do not exist or are only partial, such as in CATV and gas distribution.
Price discrimination arises for two reasons in our model. First, since local markets differ in service costs and demand, firms would prefer to charge a different price in each market. Typically, low-cost and high-density "urban markets" would be served at lower prices than high-cost and low-density "rural markets". UP constraints have been introduced precisely to create more "equity" between urban and rural areas, with the urban ones subsidizing service provision in the rural ones. Second, firms would like to charge higher prices where they are monopolists, and lower prices where they compete. A UP constraint links these markets strategically and has a decisive influence on the market equilibrium.
Our findings are as follows: If the entrant has the possibility of entering vacant high-cost areas or low-cost duopoly areas, he may choose to enter in one or both types of areas. This choice depends on the incumbent's coverage, and on whether the entrant himself is subject to a UP constraint.
In particular, entry only in high-cost areas can be optimal. The incumbent may not cover these markets so as not to drive up even further his average cost and uniform price. As a result, these markets can be served by the entrant at higher uniform or non-uniform prices. In the latter case duopoly entry is unaffected since the entrant can charge localized prices and compete effectively where he enters. On the other hand, a UP constraint makes it rather less attractive to compete in duopoly markets: First, the entrant cannot choose low prices because of the losses he would inflict on his high-cost areas. Second, if he charges high prices then he will not be a very effective competitor in the duopoly markets. In other words, the UP constraint turns the entrant into a "fat cat" (Fudenberg & Tirole, 1984) if he decides to acquire monopoly areas of his own. 1 The cable TV and broadband market in Portugal serves as an illustration of this outcome. The telecom incumbent's daughter TVCabo covers mainly the large and populous areas of Lisbon and Porto. The surrounding areas and many towns in the rural interior of Portugal are covered by competitors such as Cabovisão, using their own networks. Since the overlap of cable networks is minimal, there seems to exist a clear decision by TVCabo's competitors to avoid duplication of infrastructure and competition with the incumbent.
A further result is that if the incumbent firm is subject to a UP constraint but free to choose its coverage, it may choose a smaller coverage to avoid subsequent duopoly entry. This is an instance of the "lean and hungry look" in Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) . The necessary reduction in coverage is smaller if the entrant is subject to a UP constraint, therefore this constraint again reduces competitive entry.
The latter effect can be avoided by imposing a sufficiently large coverage constraint on the incumbent. However, even though duopoly entry will follow, it is not clear whether equilibrium prices will increase or decrease since the direct effect of the incumbent's higher coverage is a price rise.
